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Abstract
We propose revising SA-CCR to RSA-CCR by making SA-CCR self-
consistent and appropriately risk-sensitive by cashflow decomposition in
a 3-Factor Gaussian Market Model.
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1 Introduction
The request for comments (OCC 2018) offers an opportunity to address major
issues with the Basel standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit
risk exposures SA-CCR (BCBS 2014b; BCBS 2018a) and may inform other
jurisdictions (BCBS 2018b). Major issues include: lack of self-consistency for
linear trades; lack of appropriate risk sensitivity (zero positions can have ma-
terial add-ons; moneyness is ignored); dependence on economically-equivalent
confirmations. Medium issues include: ambiguity of risk assignment (i.e. re-
quirement of a single primary risk factor); and lack of clear extensibility. The
issues with SA-CCR, and the point suggestions by other authors (BCBS 2013),
highlight appropriate principles on which to reconstruct SA-CCR, namely ap-
propriate risk-sensitivity (same exposure for same economics, positive exposure
for non-zero risk), transparency, consistency, and extensibility. The scope of
this proposal is non-option interest rate products where these issues are most
significant and our objective is a replacement for the current SA-CCR in this
area which is consistent with the existing structure and principles of SA-CCR.
2
SA-CCR was designed to better address margined and unmargined trades,
reflect then-recent observed volatility levels, better represent netting, and be
simple to implement (BCBS 2014b). Some recent regulations and industry
equivalents use sensitivities (BCBS 2019; ISDA 2018; BCBS 2011) however
these are focussed on market risk (including market risk of CVA) and thus have
short horizons (days to weeks). Using sensitivities within credit risk where there
is a longer horizon (up to one year) would require including prediction of their
behaviour. This is a potentially useful avenue of investigation for a complete
update of SA-CCR which we do not propose here.
We appreciate that any standard approach needs to strike a balance between
simplicity and accuracy. Too much simplicity can lead to perverse situations
such as the ones we describe here. But unsophisticated Banks that cannot im-
plement a complex approach such as IMM still need to be adequately capitalised
via a simple approach. The issues in SA-CCR seem to be due to a slight excess
in simplification. Other Banks are probably aware of some of the issues we de-
scribe here and other issues that are not mentioned here. Also the questions in
the consultation (OCC 2018) clearly show that the regulator is fully aware of the
limitations of the current approach but requests suggestions for improvements
in special cases rather than an overhaul of the approach.
Here we propose here a global solution that revises the SA-CCR instead of
a quick fix such as those in (BCBS 2018a). We do not think it is too late to
make the standard more consistent at a marginal implementation cost (where
instead of computation of trade level add-ons, a cashflow decomposition of a
trade is performed and calculations of cashflow level add-ons for non-option
trades) and remaining within the spirit of the rules and close to the formulae.
This decomposition approach is already applied in (BCBS 2014b; OCC 2018)
for options. A start in the model-based direction is present in (BCBS 2014a)
which we generalize here.
From an implementation perspective, the RSA-CCR is accurate and fully
consistent, with a marginal increase in complexity to apply cashflow decompo-
sition to non-options as well as options. It is simple enough for small Banks
because the inputs required are used elsewhere and typically available as XML
outputs from booking systems (projected cashflow, discount factors, cashflow
fixing date/payment date).
Even if not adopted as the new Standard, we recommend at the minimum for
the RSA-CCR to become a standard control tool in other areas (such as impact
of trade confirmation dependency on Pillar 1 capital calculations, adequacy of
Pillar 1 capital) without the need of a more complex approach (such as IMM)
to assess the capital adequacy.
Longer proofs, additional details, and derivations can be found in the ac-
companying Technical appendix (Berrahoui, Islah, and Kenyon 2019).
2 Issues with SA-CCR
The main issues with SA-CCR are for linear instruments that we can illustrate
using interest rate swaps (IRS). Major and medium issues are given in Table 2.1.
Major issues are those that potentially give rise to materially incorrect capital
magnitude. Medium issues potentially give rise to material mis-assignment of
risk netting, e.g. curve risk being assigned to basis risk
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Impact Issue Trades
affected
Source
major lack of self-consistency linear trades not decomposed to cashflows
major lack of appropriate risk
sensitivity
linear trades not decomposed to cashflows
major dependence on
economically-equivalent
confirmations
linear trades not decomposed to cashflows
medium ambiguity of risk assign-
ment
linear trades not decomposed to cashflows,
and no explicit model
medium lack of clear extensibility non-
vanilla
no explicit model
medium lack of parameter trans-
parency
linear parameter not given in model terms
Table 2.1: Issues with SA-CCR. Major issues are those that potentially give
rise to materially incorrect capital magnitude. Medium issues potentially give
rise to material mis-assignment of risk netting, e.g. curve risk being assigned to
basis risk.
We demonstrate that the issues with SA-CCR can be material for simple
situations and then describe RSA-CCR.
2.1 Reminder on SA-CCR structure
We summarise salient features of SA-CCR here for convenience. Notation is
given in Table 2.2.
EAD = αEEPE = α(RC + PFE)
where for margined trades
RC = max(V − C,TH + MTA−NICA, 0)
and for unmargined trades TH + MTA − NICA ≡ 0 so RC = max(V − C, 0).
Margined trades are capped at the unmargined level to allow for large TH +
MTA. PFE is given by:
PFESA-CCR :=f
(
V − C
AddOnaggregate
)
AddOnaggregate
f(x) := min
{
1, floor + (1− floor) exp
(
x
2(1− floor)
)}
(2.1)
There is no diversification across asset classes, so add-ons simply sum to create
an aggregate add-on. Trade level add-ons are defined as
AddOntradei = δiSF
(a)
i d
(a)
i MFi
SF(a) captures risk factor volatility. d(a), the adjusted notional incorporates a
duration measure for interest rate and credit instruments.
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Symbol Meaning
EAD exposure at default
α regulatory multiplier, set at 1.4
EEPE effective expected positive exposure (this is the IMM-CCR EEPE)
RC replacement cost
PFE potential future exposure (over one year)
C haircut value of net collateral held calculated using NICA methodology
TH threshold
MTA minimum transfer amount
NICA net independent collateral amount
floor regulatory floors, e.g. set at 5% in Equation 2.1
MFi maturity factor for trade i
d
(a)
i adjusted notional for trade i w.r.t. asset class a
SF
(a)
i supervisory factor for trade i w.r.t. asset class a
MPOR margin period of risk
rt short rate
a mean reversion speed
φt deterministic mean reversion target
σ volatility
Wt Brownian motion
P (t, T ) price at t of zero coupon bond with maturity T
δτ day count fraction of underlying money market index
Table 2.2: Notation. Horizontal lines separate notation used in different sec-
tions.
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We add some details for IR trades as they are used below:
d
(IR)
i = Ni × SDi
SDi =
e−0.05Si − e−0.05Ei
0.05
where SDi is the statuary duration for trade i, and Si, Ei are the start and end
dates, and Ni is the (time-averaged) notional. The maturity factor for margined
and un-margined cases for a trade with maturity Mi, in years
MFunmarginedi :=
√
min(max(Mi,floor), 1)
MFmargined :=1.5
√
MPOR
when all time units are in years. The floor (10 or 20 business days) depends on
the number of trades, disputes, etc. The supervisory factor for interest rates is
0.5%.
Aggregation is done across the hedging set, where the hedging set is defined
by the primary risk factor. Rules for identifying the primary risk factor have
been proposed in some jurisdictions (EBA 2017).
2.2 Lack of self-consistency for linear trades
Economically equivalent positions have different capital requirements. For ex-
ample a vanilla IRS or a set of FRAs with the same strike have different add-ons,
see Table 2.3. Thus SA-CCR is not self-consistent.
Instrument SA-CCR add-on
ATM Swap 3,934,693
FRA replication 3,433,691
Split at 3Y 3,654,794
Table 2.3: Equivalent derivatives positions with different add-ons. ATM swap
is 10Y USD, 100M notional. Split means a 3Y swap and a separate forward
starting swap (starting at 3Y for 7Y) with the same fixed rate as the ATM 10Y
swap.
2.3 Lack of appropriate risk sensitivity
We illustrate two aspects here: economically zero positions can have material
add-ons; and moneyness is ignored. Ignoring moneyness is probably the more
important, for example moneyness produces systematic risk for existing posi-
tions when the general level of rates changes.
To illustrate the first case consider an IRS economically hedged with a set
of FRAs. There is a non-zero add-on despite zero risk. See Table 2.4.
Non-ATM swaps have the same regulatory add-ons but can have wildly
different actual EEPE (even using very simple dynamics). See Table 2.5
SA-CCR ignores the moneyness of linear derivatives although non-ATM
swaps can have wildly different EEPE even using very simple dynamics. Ta-
ble 2.5 shows the EEPE versus moneyness and direction asof 5th December
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Instrument SA-CCR add-on
ATM net of FRA replication 1,646,936
Table 2.4: Material add-on for zero economic position. Position is ATM swap
10Y USD 100M notional hedged by strip of FRAs.
2018. EEPE was calculated using a one factor Hull-White model calibrated to
SA-CCR (mean reversion 0.05; flat volatility 0.0189). Note that although the
Supervisory Factor is 50bps this translates directly into a Hull-White volatility
of 189bps.
Instrument Pay Receive
ATM+500bps 5,778,184 3,898,079
ATM+100bps 4,271,792 3,707,917
ATM 3,903,699 3,668,881
ATM-100bps 3,539,968 3,634,569
ATM-500bps 2,166,837 3,577,668
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y +500bps 4,712,043 4,891,493
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y +100bps 3,932,090 3,931,231
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y 3,737,350 3,691,418
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y -100bps 3,542,763 3,451,756
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y -500bps 2,766,729 2,495,425
Table 2.5: EEPE versus moneyness and direction calculated using one factor
Hull-White model calibrated to SA-CCR mean reversion 0.05; flat volatility
0.0189. Under SA-CCR the top five trades have the same add-on, as to the
bottom five. ATM swap is 10Y USD. All instruments have USD 100M notional
Thus SA-CCR does not have appropriate risk sensitivity since economically
zero positions can have material add-ons, and moneyness is ignored which can
exclude material risk differences.
2.4 Dependence on economically-equivalent confirmations
We can construct zero add-ons for any interest rate swap with maturity T ≥1
year where T and 2T are in the same maturity bucket as follows:
• A receiver (rate R) amortising swap with notional 3 e0.05 T
e0.05 T−1 N between
today and T , then notional e
0.05 T
e0.05 T−1N between T and 2T ;
• A payer (rate R) swap with maturity 2T and notional 2 e0.05 T
e0.05 T−1N ;
• A forward start (starting at T and maturity at 2T ) receiver (rate R) swap
with notional e
0.05 T
e0.05 T−1N ;
• A payer swap (rate R) with maturity T and notional 1
e0.05 T−1N .
The adjusted notional for the first two swaps is the same, 2 e
0.05 T
e0.05 T−1 N, and
they are in opposite directions, so their net addon is zero. MF is the same for
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the third and fourth trade, 1 (as T > 1), as is SF(IR), both 0.05. The sum of
direction and adjusted delta is:∑
i=3,4
δid
(IR)
i =
e0.05 T
e0.05 T − 1N
e−0.05T − e−0.05×2T
0.05
− 1
e0.05 T − 1N
1− e−0.05T
0.05
=0
So the net add-on for the third and fourth trades is also zero. Now the net
economics over all four trades is zero for T to 2T , but is a net receiver swap
from 0 to T with flat notional N(e0.05T − 1)/(e0.05T − 1) = N .
Thus SA-CCR has dependence on economically-equivalent confirmations.
2.5 Medium issues
There is only one primary risk factor for each trade. This will mis-allocate risk
netting where there are several key risk drivers, e.g. long term FX. The lack of
clarity that this produces is evident as some jurisdictions are creating additional
rules to resolve the ambiguity of the single decision, e.g. (EBA 2017). Of course
this does not solve the mis-allocation of risk netting. As we will show below,
cashflow decomposition used with an explicit model automatically produces
risks in their appropriate hedging sets and buckets.
There is a lack of transparency of the meaning of regulatory parameters in
SA-CCR. This could be simply resolved if there was an explicit model. For
example although the interest rate Supervisory Factor for volatility is stated as
50bps this translates directly into a Gaussian Market Model volatility of 189bps.
Again, using an explicit model base automatically provides transparency pro-
vided the model is simple.
3 RSA-CCR: cashflow and model-based SA-CCR
To solve the issues with SA-CCR we propose a cashflow and model-based SA-
CCR, which we call Revised SA-CCR (RSA-CCR). We pick the model by iden-
tifying it from the SA-CCR standard itself using the link between trade level
add-ons and the volatility of the present value of the trade in (BCBS 2014a).
Basing RSA-CCR on cashflows automatically solves the lack of self-consistency,
lack of appropriate risk-sensitivity, dependence on economically-equivalent con-
firmations. Using a model assigns risk unambiguously, provides clear extensi-
bility and provides parameter transparency.
3.1 Model identification
Similarly to (BCBS 2014a), we can define the theoretical add-on at a horizon
T of a trade with value process Vt as the following average expected positive
exposure:
AddOnV (T ) =
1
T
∫ T
0
E
[
(V (t)− V (0))+
]
dt
Assuming dV (t) = σdW (t), then we obtain the trade level theoretical add-on
at horizon T at :
AddOnV (T ) =
2
3
σ
√
T
2pi
(3.1)
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Recall the SA-CCR trade add-ons for IR trades:
AddOntrade = δN · SF IR e
−0.05S − e−0.05E
0.05
MF
Taking a payer swap longer than one year means that MF = 1, and δ = 1. The
supervisory factor SF IR = 0.005 for interest rates, so we define:
σHW :=
3
2
√
2piSF IR
Consider a one factor Hull-White model with short rate, r(t) and mean reversion
parameter a = 0.05 :
drt = a(φt − rt)dt+ σHW dWt (3.2)
For an ATM swap with start date Ts and end date Te notional N , we show in
Theorem 3.1 that the volatility of the present value of the swap (assuming a flat
discount curve with zero rate) is:
σATM(0) = N
σHW
a
(e−aTs − e−aTe)
Given the relation (3.1) between theoretical add-on and trade volatility, we
obtain a model based add-on for the ATM swap, identical to the SA-CCR add-
on :
AddOntrade = N · 2σHW
3
√
2pi
e−aTs − e−aTe
a
= N · SF IR e
−aTs − e−aTe
a
Thus SA-CCR and (BCBS 2014a) themselves implicitly identify an appropriate
model. Given that SA-CCR and (BCBS 2014a) can be interpreted as using a 1-
Factor Hull-White model we extend this to a 3-factor model to take into account
the correlation structure of the different maturity zones in Section 3.3 below.
Correlations between add-ons are mapped to correlations between zero-coupon
bonds.
3.2 Identity of SA-CCR and 1-Factor Hull-White for sin-
gle maturity bucket
Here we provide the details to establish a formal correspondence of ATM Swap
add-ons between SA-CCR and HW 1 factor. This correspondence being estab-
lished, the regulatory parameters corresponding to model parameters are seen
to be as in the previous section. This process also shows how to extend SA-CCR
consistently to non-ATM trades.
A one factor Hull-White model (Hull and White 1990) has short rate, r(t),
dynamics given by Equation 3.2 above, so the dynamics of a zero coupon bond
P (t, T ) price are:
dP (t, T ) = rtP (t, T )dt− σ
a
(1− e−a(T−t))P (t, T )dWt (3.3)
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Consider a payer, i.e. pay-fixed rate R,notional N , swap price V at t
V (t) = Vfloat(t)− Vfixed(t)
= N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti)δiL(t, Ti−1, Ti)−N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti)δiR
Now we have the identity between SA-CCR and a 1-Factor Hull-White model
in Theorem 3.1 below.
Theorem 3.1. With zero bond dynamics given by Equation 3.3, if V is the
value process of a forward starting payer swap, then the instantaneous volatility
of V for t ≤ Ts can be decomposed into three contributions :
σV (t) = σATM(t) + σFloat(t) + σFixed(t)
Where :
σATM(t) =N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti−1)
σ
a
(e−a(Ti−1−t) − e−a(Ti−t))
σFloat(t) =−N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti)
σ
a
(1− e−a(Ti−1−t))δiL(t, Ti−1, Ti)
σFixed(t) =N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti)
σ
a
(1− e−a(Ti−t))δiR
If at time t, the swap is ATM, taking the standard weight-freezing assumption
(see proof) we have:
σV (t) = N
e∑
i=s+1
P (t, Ti)
σ
a
(e−a(Ti−1−t) − e−a(Ti−t)) = σATM(t)
Moreover if the yield curve is flat and equal to zero, then the instantaneous
volatility of an ATM swap in one maturity bucket is given exactly by the SA-
CCR regulatory formula i.e.:
σATM(t) = N
σ
a
(e−a(Ts−t) − e−a(Te−t))
See Technical appendix (Berrahoui, Islah, and Kenyon 2019) for proof.
The swap volatility can be decomposed into two contributions:
• volatility of the floating rate index itself: σATM (t)
• volatility of the present value of the cash-flows: σfloat(t) + σfixed(t)
Since for SA-CCR only exposures below one year are relevant we freeze the
volatility σV (t) and use its initial value σV (0) so
σV (t) ≈ N
e∑
i=s+1
P (0, Ti−1)
σ
a
(e−aTi−1 − e−aTi))
+N
e∑
i=s+1
δiP (0, Ti)
σ
a
(1− e−aTi) (R− L(0, Ti−1, Ti))
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T < 1 1 ≤ T < 5 5 ≤ T
T < 1 1 ρ1 ρ2
1 ≤ T < 5 ρ1 1 ρ1
5 ≤ T ρ2 ρ1 1
Table 3.1: Correlation structure of SA-CCR interest rates add-ons by instrument
maturity T , where ρ1 = 0.7 and ρ2 = 0.3.
3.3 Matching inter-bucket correlations: 3-factor Gaussian
Market Model
Theorem 3.1 shows that the regulatory add-on formula for an at-the-money swap
can be recovered from a 1-factor Hull-White model. To match the inter-bucket
correlations of SA-CCR, Table 3.1, we naturally move to a 3-factor Gaussian
Market Model:
• We use maturity buckets defined by SA-CCR: M1 = [0, 1), M2 = [1, 5),
M3 = [5,∞)
• We also define M(t) = ∑i 1t∈MiMi a map from positive numbers to the
set of maturity buckets
• Next we define the correlated Brownian motions ZMkt , k = 1, 2, 3 with
SA-CCR correlation structure i.e. dZM1t dZ
M2
t = dZ
M2
t dZ
M3
t = 0.7 and:
dZM1t dZ
M3
t = 0.3
We define the following 3-factor Gaussian Market Model extension of the
Hull-White model that allows to recover the inter-bucket correlations for zero
coupon bonds (with expiries T in a discrete set T1, .., TN covering all business
days up to horizon TN ) i.e :
dP (t, T ) = rtP (t, T ) · dt− σ
a
(1− e−a·(T−t)) · P (t, T ) · dZM(T )t
Where rt is the risk free rate (define as the continuously compounded rate
of the shortest maturity zero-coupon bond). Now we have a model identified
from SA-CCR we can move on to the second key element of RSA-CCR, cashflow
decomposition for linear products.
3.4 Cashflow decomposition for linear products
We first define the scope, concentrating on common linear product cashflows
(which we call elementary cashflows) in Definition 3.2 and then provide The-
orem 3.3 that gives the add-ons for each of the different cashflow types. In
Section 4 we give an example derivation of the entries in Table 3.2 for a Float-
ing cashflow (with deterministic and stochastic basis). Full derivation are in
the accompanying Technical appendix (Berrahoui, Islah, and Kenyon 2019). In
Section 5 we compare the performance of SA-CCR and RSA-CCR.
From the examples here and in (Berrahoui, Islah, and Kenyon 2019), the
add-ons for other (less common) cashflows in linear products can be derived in
a similar manner.
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Definition 3.2. An elementary cashflow with payment date at T and projected
value CF (T ) (viewed from 0) that is either the projected value of:
• a fixed cashflow CF (T ) = N ;
• a standard interest rates floating cashflow (as defined in point 2) , with
notional N , money market index L(t, t + δ(τ)) tenor τ , fixing date 0 <
Tf ≤ T defined as :
δτ N L(Tf , Tf + δτ )
• a standard CMS cashflow with notional N and swap rate Sτ (Ts, Te) fixing
at 0 < Ts ≤ T , with underlying money market tenor τ , maturity at Te,
swap tenor δ(Ts, Te), defined as :
δτ N Sτ (Ts, Te)
• a standard inflation floating cashflow, with notional N,defined on inflation
index I(t),with initial observation date Ts (can be in the past ), next
observation date τI and final observation date Te ≤ T :
N
(
I(Te)
I(Ts)
− 1
)
• a standard inflation compound cashflow with notional N,with initial ob-
servation date Ts (can be in the past ), next observation date τI and final
observation Te ≤ T :
N
I(Te)
I(Ts)
• a standard interest rates compound cashflow , with start of compounding
at Ts(cn be in the past i.e. , next reset date τC , end of last compounding
Te, underlying index L(t, t+ δτ ), with tenor τ . This cashflow is given by :
N
e−1∏
k=s
(1 + δτ L(Tk, Tk + τ)
Theorem 3.3. All elementary cashflows received (respectively paid) at time T ,
should have an add-on contribution using the supervisory formula
AddOncashflow = δSF(IR)d(IR)MF
to the maturity bucket corresponding to the payment date itself T with follwing
inputs to use in the supervisory formula:
• a delta equal to −1 (respectively 1 ) ,
• start date of 0 and end date of T to compute the supervisory duration
• an adjusted notional equal to present value of the cashflow
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Cashflow
Hedging
set
Maturity
bucket
Effective Notional Start End Delta
Floating
Rates,
Basis
M(Tf ) (N + CF (T )) P (0, T ) 0 Tf −1
M(Tf + τ) (N + CF (T )) P (0, T ) 0 Tf + τ +1
Compound
Rates ,
Basis
M(max(τc, Ts)) CF (T ) P (0, T ) 0 max(τc, Ts) −1
M(Te) CF (T ) P (0, T ) 0 Te +1
CMS
Rates,
Basis
M1
δτ
δ(Ts,Te)
(N+CF (T )) P (0, T ) min(1, Ts) min(1, Te) −1
M2
δτ
δ(Ts,Te)
(N+CF (T )) P (0, T ) min(max(1, Ts), 5) min(max(1, Te), 5) +1
M3
δτ
δ(Ts,Te)
(N+CF (T )) P (0, T ) max(5, Ts) max(5, Te) +1
Inflation
Floating
Inflation
M(max(τI , Ts)) (N + CF (T )) P (0, T ) 0 M(max(τI , Ts)) −1
Te (N + CF (T )) P (0, T ) 0 Te +1
Inflation
Compound
Inflation
M(max(τI , Ts)) CF (T ) P (0, T ) 0 M(max(τI , Ts)) −1
Te CF (T ) P (0, T ) 0 Te +1
Table 3.2: Add-ons components for the elementary cashflows listed in Definition 3.2. Hedging sets for rates cashflows are
Rates and Basis per currency. Hedging sets for inflation cashflows are inflation per currency. Derivations of these values
follow the Floating example in Section 4 and details are given in the accompanying Technical appendix, including Floating
and CMS examples in full.
Moreover, all non-fixed standard cashflows will have other add-ons contributions
due to the volatility of their respective underlying indices, calculated using the
supervisory formulae (with inputs as per Table 3.2) and allocated to the appro-
priate maturity buckets and hedging sets (as stated in Table 3.2 for received
cash-flows).
With CF (T ) is the projected cash-flow, the map M(t) that associates to t its
risk bucket and P (0, T ) the discount factor. Basis risk add-ons are allocated to
the money market index τ vs discount hedging set.
Setting P (0, T ) = 1 would result in simplified add-ons in line with current
regulatory stipulations
In RSA-CCR add-on contributions for linear products are the aggregate
add-on of the add-ons for each cashflow . This removes the SA-CCR issues
above: lack of self-consistency; lack of appropriate risk sensitivity; dependence
on economically-equivalent confirmations. We formalize add-on calculations via
cashflow decomposition in the definitions below.
Definition 3.4. A linear product has no optionality and is made of elementary
cash-flows CFi with payment dates Ti (i = 1, .., n) and notional Ni.
Definition 3.5. The total add-on of a portfolio of linear products is obtained
from the aggregation of the individual add-ons of each cash-flow that makes up
the linear products. Add-on aggregation is performed according to SA-CCR.
Proposition 3.6. All portfolios of linear products resulting in the same net
cash-flows have the same aggregate add-on under RSA-CCR.
Proof. By construction the add-ons depend only on the net cash-flows.
Propostion 3.6 is the property we are after: this ensure appropriate risk
sensitivity (no risk for no economic position and vice versa) and no dependence
on economically-equivalent confirmations.
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4 Example add-on derivation for a xibor coupon
Here we provide an example of how to derive the entries in Table 3.2 for a
floating coupon for deterministic and stochastic index-vs-discounting basis.
The floating rate cash-flow is based on a money market index with fixing at
Tf , tenor τ (less than 1 year) and payment at T ≥ τ , with notional N .
We ignore convexity so this setup includes timing mismatches such as a Libor
rate paid in advance.
The forward value of the index is
δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ) = Pf (t, Tf )/Pf (t, Tf + τ)− 1
We define the index-vs-discounting basis Pb via
Pf (t, s) = Pb(t, s)P (t, s)
Ignoring convexity the coupon value is
V (t) = NP (t, T )(Pf (t, Tf )/Pf (t, Tf + τ)− 1)
Applying Ito’s Lemma to V (t) we see that the instantaneous volatility of V (t)
has three components, one from the floating rate index volatility, another from
the cashflow’s present value and a third from the basis risk volatility:
dVt = (..)dt+N [δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ)dP (t, T )
+ P (t, T )Pb(t, Tf )/Pf (t, Tf + τ)dP (t, Tf ) + P (t, T )Pf (t, Tf )/Pb(t, Tf + τ)d(1/P (t, Tf + τ))
+ P (t, T )P (t, Tf )/Pf (t, Tf + τ)dPb(t, Tf ) + P (t, T )Pf (t, Tf )/P (t, Tf + τ)d(1/Pb(t, Tf + τ))]
No dP∗dP∗ terms are present above as these result in drift (dt) contributions
not volatility (dW∗) contributions.
4.1 Floating coupon: deterministic basis
Assume first that the basis curve is deterministic, then we have for P (t, T ),
P (t, Tf ) and P (t, Tf + τ) the following dynamics from the 3-factor Gaussian
Market Model:
dP (t, T ) =(..)dt− σ
a
(1− e−a(T−t))P (t, T )dZM(T )t
dP (t, Tf ) =(..).dt− σ
a
(1− e−a(T−t))P (t, T )dZM(Tf )t
d(
1
P (t, Tf + τ)
) =(..).dt+
σ
a
(1− e−a(Tf+τ−t)) 1
P (t, Tf + τ)
dZ
M(Tf+τ)
t
Hence
dVt = rtVtdt− σ
a
(1− e−a(T−t))P (t, T )NδτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ)dZM(T )t
− σ
a
(1− e−a(Tf−t))P (t, T )N(1 + δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ))dZM(Tf )t (4.1)
+
σ
a
(1− e−a(Tf+τ−t))P (t, T )N(1 + δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ))dZM(Tf+τ)t
From Equation 4.1 we see that the floating rate cash-flow add-ons bucket con-
tributions are:
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1. contribution from the present value of the cash-flow:
• Maturity bucket M(T )
• Notional: NP (0, T )τL(0, Tf , Tf + τ)
• Duration: 1a (1− e−aT )
• Delta : −1
2. index volatility: fixing date contribution
• Maturity bucket M(Tf )
• Effective Notional: NP (0, T )(1 + δτL(0, Tf , Tf + τ))
• Duration: 1a (1− e−aTf )
• Delta : −1
3. index volatility: payment date contribution
• Maturity bucket M(Tf + τ)
• Effective Notional: NP (0, T )(1 + τL(0, Tf , Tf + τ))
• Supervisory Duration: 1a (1− e−a(Tf+τ))
• Delta : 1
4.2 Floating coupon: stochastic basis
If we assume a stochastic basis spread curve (some implementation scenarios
for Libor decommissioning fallback may make this irrelevant) as
dPb(t, Tf ) = (..).dt− σb
a
(1− e−a(Tf−t))Pb(t, T )dZM(Tf )t,b
d
(
1
Pb(t, Tf + τ)
)
= (..).dt+
σb
a
(1− e−a(Tf+τ−t)) 1
Pb(t, Tf + τ)
dZ
M(Tf+τ)
t.b
The volatility of V (t) adds basis contributions
dVt =(..)dt+ (..)dZ
M(T )
t + (..)dZ
M(Tf )
t + (..)dZ
M(Tf+τ)
t
− σb
a
(1− e−a(Tf−t))P (t, T )N(1 + δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ))dZM(Tf )t,b
+
σb
a
(1− e−a(Tf+τ−t))P (t, T )N(1 + δτL(t, Tf , Tf + τ))dZM(Tf+τ)t.b
This gives additional contributions to two buckets, one for the fixing date and
another for the fixing date shifted by the underlying tenor:
4. fixing date:
• Maturity bucket M(Tf )
• Effective Notional: NP (0, T )(1 + δτL(0, Tf , Tf + τ))
• Duration: 1a (1− e−aTf )
• Delta : −1
5. payment date of the underlying money market index :
• Maturity bucket M(Tf + τ)
• Effective Notional: NP (0, T )(1 + τL(0, Tf , Tf + τ))
• Supervisory Duration: 1a (1− e−a(Tf+τ))
• Delta : 1
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5 RSA-CCR performance versus SA-CCR
Here we compare RSA-CCR add-ons versus SA-CCR add-ons, and versus a
simulation of Gaussian Market Model, and provide reference comparison to a
1-Factor Hull-White for completeness. Both RSA-CCR and SA-CCR can be
considered approximations to the simulation results. These examples demon-
strate that RSA-CCR has appropriate risk sensitivity as compared to SA-CCR,
and showing results of ambiguity resolution in RSA-CCR, i.e. it is clear what
to do for zero coupon swaps. Of course, by construction RSA-CCR does not
suffer from dependence on economically-equivalent confirmations.
• Vanilla Swaps with different moneyness, Table 5.1. SA-CCR is insensitive
to moneyness, showing a 56% range of error w.r.t. the simulation, whereas
RSA-CCR error range is 2%.
Instrument SA-CCR RSA-CCR
with no
discounting
RSA-CCR
with market
discount
HW1F
Average
Pay/Receive
Add-ons
Shifted
LMM
3F Average
Pay/Receive
Add-on
ATM Swap 4% 3% -5% 0% 3,783,285
ATM+100 bps -1% 3% -5% 0% 3,984,416
ATM+500bps -19% 1% -6% 0% 4,829,860
ATM-100bps 10% 3% -4% -0% 3,588,130
ATM-500bps 37% 1% -6% -0% 2,875,001
Table 5.1: Vanilla Swaps with varying moneyness, percentage differences from Gaussian Market Model in
last column. The ATM swap is referred to below as AS.
• Vanilla swaps with different replications, Table 5.2. Here SA-CCR’s max-
imum error w.r.t. simulation is infinite as it gives non-zero risk for a zero
economic position. In contrast RSA-CCR has a 5% range or errors, and
maximum error of -5%.
Instrument SA-CCR RSA-CCR
with no
discounting
RSA-CCR
with market
discount
HW1F
Average
Pay/Receive
Add-ons
Shifted
LMM
3F Average
Pay/Receive
Add-on
ATM Swap 4% 3% -5% 0% 3,783,285
FRA Replication -9% 3% -5% 0% 3,783,285
ATM – FRAs inf% 0% 0% 0% 0
split at 3Y -3% 3% -5% 0% 3,783,285
Table 5.2: Vanilla Swaps with different replications, percentage differences from HW1F in last column.
• Amortising/Accreting vanilla swaps vs combination of swaps, Table 5.3.
Here the SA-CCR range of error is 98% (in one case it gives zero add-
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on for non-zero risk). The range of error for RSA-CCR is 28% with no
discounting or 14% with market discounting versus the simulation.
Instrument SA-CCR Full ap-
proach with
discount
equal 1
RSA-CCR
with market
discount
HW1F
Average
Pay/Receive
Add-ons
Shifted
LMM
3F Average
Pay/Receive
Add-on
Amortising
10Y:5Y/100M;5Y/200M
-2% 1% -5% -2% 5,996,321
FRA replication -8% 1% -5% -2% 5,996,321
5Y/200M and forward start
5Y5Y/100M
-4% 1% -5% -2% 5,996,321
10Y/100M and 5Y/100M -5% 1% -5% -2% 5,996,321
Amortising minus 10Y/150M -100% -29% -17% -25% 352,986
Table 5.3: Amortising Swaps, percentage differences from Gaussian Market Model in last column.
• Zero coupon swaps, Table 5.4. The range of error of SA-CCR is 99% in
contrast to RSA-CCR with 3%.
Instrument SA-CCR Full ap-
proach with
discount
equal 1
RSA-CCR
with market
discount
HW1F
Average
Pay/Receive
Add-ons
Shifted
LMM
3F Average
Pay/Receive
Add-on
Zero Coupon ATM 10y -2% 15% -3% -1% 3,999,402
Zero Coupon ATM+100bps 10 yr -9% 15% -3% -1% 4,341,650
Zero Coupon ATM+500bps 10 yr -27% 15% -2% -3% 5,368,783
Zero Coupon ATM-100bps 10 yr 8% 15% -3% -1% 3,657,255
Zero Coupon ATM-500bps 10 yr 72% 14% -3% -4% 2,290,554
Table 5.4: Zero Coupon Swaps, percentage differences from Gaussian Market Model in last column.
• Forward starts, Table 5.5. The range of error of SA-CCR is 68% in contrast
to RSA-CCR with 1%.
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Instrument SA-CCR RSA-CCR
with no
discounting
RSA-CCR
with market
discount
HW1F
Average
Pay/Receive
Add-ons
Shifted
LMM
3F Average
Pay/Receive
Add-on
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y 2% 6% -3% 1% 3,668,070
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y +100bps -4% 6% -3% 1% 3,888,496
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y +500bps -22% 7% -3% 1% 4,772,075
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y -100bps 9% 6% -3% 1% 3,447,875
Fwd Start ATM 1y-10y -500bps 46% 6% -2% 2% 2,570,157
Table 5.5: Forward Staring Swaps, percentage differences from Gaussian Market Model in last column.
6 Conclusions
SA-CCR has major issues including: lack of self-consistency for linear trades;
lack of appropriate risk sensitivity (zero positions can have material add-ons;
moneyness is ignored); dependence on economically-equivalent confirmations.
We have shown that SA-CCR is, by parameter identification and re-construction,
based on a 3-factor Gaussian Market Model model. Hence we propose RSA-
CCR based on cashflow decomposition and this 3-factor Gaussian Market Model
model. RSA-CCR is both free of SA-CCR’s issues, simple to use in practice,
and can be extended easily given that it is model-based. We recommend updat-
ing SA-CCR to RSA-CCR in order to resolve SA-CCR’s issues of lack of self-
consistency for linear trades, lack of appropriate risk sensitivity (zero positions
can have material add-ons; moneyness is ignored), dependence on economically-
equivalent confirmations, and ambiguity of application for cases not explicitly
described.
For a consistent treatment of the FX risk factors within the RSA-CCR cash-
flow decomposition approach, it is enough to consider only the currency pairs
with respect to the domestic currency i.e. CCY/USD as hedging sets. The add-
on contributions to the FX asset class (hedging set CCY/USD) for an elementary
linear cashflow in the currency CCY (regardless of the product type) is simply
the present value of the cash-flow converted to the domestic currency USD.
Moreover, each cashflow has an interest rate add-on contribution as computed
for each elementary cashflow by the RSA-CCR approach.
We recommend updating SA-CCR to RSA-CCR in order to resolve SA-
CCR’s issues of lack of self-consistency for linear trades, lack of appropriate risk
sensitivity (zero positions can have material add-ons; moneyness is ignored),
dependence on economically-equivalent confirmations, and ambiguity of appli-
cation for cases not explicitly described.
A Parametrization of Gaussian Market Model
simulated using shifted libor market model
The Gaussian Market Model is simulated using a 3-Factor Shifted Libor Market
Model where the calibration is derived from the Gaussian Market Model setup.
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Volatility and shift calibration is shown in Table A.1.
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Libor Start Libor End Factor 1 Vol Factor 2 Vol Factor 3 Vol Shift
05/03/2019 05/06/2019 0.004651126 0 0 3.96  
05/06/2019 05/09/2019 0.004592877 0 0 3.96  
05/09/2019 05/12/2019 -0.00101487 0.013095563 0 4.00  
05/12/2019 05/03/2020 0.003101551 0.003164215 0 4.00  
05/03/2020 05/06/2020 0.003096577 0.00315914 0 3.96  
05/06/2020 07/09/2020 0.003123843 0.003186958 0 3.87  
07/09/2020 07/12/2020 0.002986067 0.003046398 0 4.00  
07/12/2020 05/03/2021 0.002852437 0.002910068 0 4.14  
05/03/2021 07/06/2021 0.003009178 0.003069975 0 3.87  
07/06/2021 06/09/2021 0.002876459 0.002934575 0 4.00  
06/09/2021 06/12/2021 0.002840824 0.00289822 0 4.00  
06/12/2021 07/03/2022 0.002805631 0.002862316 0 4.00  
07/03/2022 06/06/2022 0.002770874 0.002826856 0 4.00  
06/06/2022 05/09/2022 0.002736547 0.002791836 0 4.00  
05/09/2022 05/12/2022 0.002702646 0.00275725 0 4.00  
05/12/2022 06/03/2023 0.002669164 0.002723092 0 4.00  
06/03/2023 05/06/2023 0.002636098 0.002689357 0 4.00  
05/06/2023 05/09/2023 0.00263187 0.002685044 0 3.96  
05/09/2023 05/12/2023 -0.030713061 0.022543938 0.002261852 4.00  
05/12/2023 05/03/2024 0.001088137 0.003458652 9.85945E-05 4.00  
05/03/2024 05/06/2024 0.001086392 0.003453105 9.84364E-05 3.96  
05/06/2024 05/09/2024 0.001072787 0.003409859 9.72036E-05 3.96  
05/09/2024 05/12/2024 0.001047909 0.003330784 9.49494E-05 4.00  
05/12/2024 05/03/2025 0.001023624 0.003253594 9.2749E-05 4.05  
05/03/2025 05/06/2025 0.001033408 0.003284695 9.36356E-05 3.96  
05/06/2025 05/09/2025 0.001020466 0.003243559 9.24629E-05 3.96  
05/09/2025 05/12/2025 0.000996801 0.003168339 9.03187E-05 4.00  
05/12/2025 05/03/2026 0.000973701 0.003094915 8.82256E-05 4.05  
05/03/2026 05/06/2026 0.000983008 0.003124499 8.90689E-05 3.96  
05/06/2026 07/09/2026 0.000991664 0.003152011 8.98532E-05 3.87  
07/09/2026 07/12/2026 0.000947927 0.003012992 8.58902E-05 4.00  
07/12/2026 05/03/2027 0.000905506 0.002878157 8.20465E-05 4.14  
05/03/2027 07/06/2027 0.000955264 0.003036311 8.6555E-05 3.87  
07/06/2027 06/09/2027 0.000913132 0.002902395 8.27375E-05 4.00  
06/09/2027 06/12/2027 0.00090182 0.002866439 8.17125E-05 4.00  
06/12/2027 06/03/2028 0.000890648 0.002830929 8.07002E-05 4.00  
06/03/2028 05/06/2028 0.000879614 0.002795858 7.97005E-05 4.00  
05/06/2028 05/09/2028 0.000878203 0.002791374 7.95727E-05 3.96  
05/09/2028 05/12/2028 0.000857837 0.002726641 7.77273E-05 4.00  
05/12/2028 05/03/2029 0.000837957 0.002663453 7.5926E-05 4.05  
05/03/2029 05/06/2029 0.000845967 0.002688912 7.66518E-05 3.96  
05/06/2029 05/09/2029 0.000835373 0.002655237 7.56918E-05 3.96  
05/09/2029 05/12/2029 0.000816 0.002593662 7.39365E-05 4.00  
Table A.1: 3-Factor Shifted Libor Market Model calibration modeling Gaussian
Market Model.
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